一位美国前总统曾经说过：“一个人的名誉就像一件精美的瓷器，一旦受损就很难修复。”正因为名誉对人们如此重要，人们才会不惜一切的保护它。
为了检验这一理论，并弄清谣言对当事人行为，尤其是经济上的慷慨行为的影响，英国研究人员设计了一个有趣的试验。相关报道发表在2008年5月的爱思唯尔期刊《进化与人类行为》（Evolution and Human Behavior）上。
研究人员招募了72名大学生，他们需要分配10枚筹码，可以给别人，也可以留给自己。从经济学角度考虑，最优策略是把所有10枚筹码都留给自己。试验中，一部分受试者被引导相信：其他受试者中，匿名的第二方会向第三方透露自己的筹码分配决定。此外，一部分上述第三方的身份信息是大家已知的。这样，第三方的声誉便有了受损的风险。试验结果显示，谣言对人的行为影响巨大。那些名誉受到谣言威胁的受试者，在分配筹码的过程中表现得更加慷慨。
这项研究明确表明，感觉自己正被谣言威胁，名誉有受损危险，将促使人们实施慷慨的亲社会行为，目的是维护自己的名誉。（科学网 荔涛/编译）
生物谷推荐原始出处：
Evolution and Human Behavior，doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002，Jared Piazza and Jesse M. Bering
Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game
Jared Piazza, a, and Jesse M. Beringa
aInstitute of Cognition and Culture, Queen’s University, Belfast, 2-4 Fitzwilliam St., Nothern Ireland, BT7 1NN, UK
Abstract
In the present study, a modified dictator game was used to test the hypothesis that the threat of gossip would encourage prosocial decision making. All participants were asked to distribute an endowment between themselves and an anonymous second party. Half of the participants were told that the second party would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was someone to whom they had first disclosed personally identifying information. Participants who received the threat of gossip manipulation were more generous than control participants, but only when the third party could personally identify them was this difference significant. These data reveal that at least some prosocial decisions are motivated by actor's reputational concerns—concerns that are directly mediated by language.
